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I. Introduction
Most recently, after the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, the conflict between Hamas and Fatah affects the establishment of unity government. There have been many initiatives undertaken to solve Hamas-Fatah conflict. These initiatives ended up with signing three agreements: Mecca, Cairo and Doha Agreements in 2007, 2011 and 2012 respectively. The main objective of these agreements is to establish national unity government based on reconciliation framework. However, the reconciliation processes have been threatened by power struggle one over the other, less support from the international communities. As a result, the reconciliation processes are doomed to failure at their early stage.
This paper seeks to explore stumbling blocks for reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah. Hypothetically, the main cause of the conflict is lack of equilibrium of power between Hamas and Fatah. As a theoretical framework, classical realism, more specifically Morgenthau's classical realism theory, is employed. Qualitative historical analysis is used to understand the dynamism of stumbling blocks of the reconciliation process within their historical context. [url=http://www.thehygienerevolution.com/hollister.php]hollister[/url] For empirical analysis, data is collated from agreement documents, journals, newspaper articles, books, institutions reports and internet polls. The paper first discuses the theoretical framework, then presents empirical findings and finally proffers the main arguments of the work.
II.Crafting Theoretical Framework
Rationale of Classical Realism
The theoretical history of classical realism can be traced back to the works of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. They paid high attention on national security, state survival, anarchism and political power (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008). Since, humans are seen as self-centric, egoist, competitions and conflict to dominate one over the other are inevitable and natural. These inevitable situations further triggered by asymmetrical capabilities of humans and states. Thucydides considers the existence of weak and strong nations is given by nature and their existences depend on "their own capability" to defend themselves (Jackson and S??rensen 2010: 61). For Machiavelli, asymmetrical capabilities are emanated from human nature and 'national freedom' is the ultimate objective of political activities (Dunne and Schmidt 2005). Hobbes argues that 'domestic peace' is essential to mobilize citizens against foreign powers and also assuring domestic peace is the ultimate aim of the establishment of state.
The conception of power in Morgenthau's theory has a naturalistic feature. 'Politics' is defined as "governed by objective laws", [url=http://www.tagverts.com/barbour.php]barbour online shop[/url] which are emanated from human nature and seen as human interests defined in terms of power (Morgenthau 2006: 4). Moreover, he defines power as "Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man" (ibid: 11). Thus, political power is seen as a struggle between different interests, which are defined in terms of power. According to him, maintaining peace within this world structure is decidedly depend upon the capability to construct a system of "balance of power" (Ibid: 9), which is in approximation term, not in absolute. Thus, in Morgenthau's classical realism peace is defined in terms of the capabilities to minimize the inequality of powers through balancing powers. Therefore, power and peace are the main rationale of his classical realism. However, their conceptions and as to how to achieve power and peace depend on the contextualization of political pow-er/struggle and its ultimate objective.
Domestic and International Politics
Morgenthau argues that the very [url=http://www.sandvikfw.net/shopuk.php]hollister sale[/url] essence of politics, both international and domestic, is "power politics" (2006: 35). The characterization of all forms of politics as power politics is emanated from a pessimistic view of human nature. He notes:
"The essence of international politics is identical with its domestic counterpart. Both domestic and international politics are a struggle for power, modified only by the difference conditions under which this struggle takes place[...]"(ibid: 37).
Hence, the prevalence of different conditions in domestic and international political arena determines the forms of political struggle, domination and acquisition of power. In domestic level, if democratic system is well established, periodical election is a form of continuous struggle for power. However, the existence of anarchism differs international [url=http://www.xacydz.com/service/feedback_look.php?id=1969]abercrombie Get Back In That Bikini - A Bikini Diet That Works! - written by Walter Derksen[/url] politics with that of domestic politics and each independent sovereign state acts upon "self-help-principle" (Dunne and Schmidt 2005:164). In domestic politics, it is easy to constrain and channel the power within non-violence mechanism due to the existence of a hierarchical structure, i.e. central government, to control the means of violence.

Thus, the main difference between domestic and international politics is that of the existence of anarchism in international politics and a hierarchic structure in domestic politics. This differentiation can be threatened in the absence of a hierarchic political organization in domestic politics. In the case of civil war where the central government lost its capacity to control over the life of its citizen and opposition(s) is/are not capable to bring an end to the prevailing regime, war and mess are inevitable. The prevailing condition in Palestinian's politics is the best example. In this case, classical realism can be used to analyze domestic politics.
Balance of [url=http://www.rtnagel.com/louboutin.php]louboutin[/url] Power and Peace
The concept of balance of power is both normative and an empirical concept (Morgenthau 2006: 180-1). He defines balance of power as "an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality" (ibid: 179). This definition is not precise enough to demarcate the scope of the concept . Nominally, he associated actual state of affairs with distribution of power among states. Hence, balance of power is a desirable instrument to put a stop or an end to hegemonic domination and supremacy by a state over the others. Thus, balance of power is a means to assure state survival, national interest and security. Accordingly, he identifies two typical patterns of the balance of power: "the pattern of direct opposition" and "the pattern of competition" (ibid: 184-7). The earlier is expressed in terms of policy or action that is designed as a counter of an imperialist policy. The later is focused on competitive capabilities of a state with other or among states to limit the possibilities to achieve absolute control or hegemonic dominance.
Balance of power in domestic politics takes place "within a relatively stable and integrated society" (ibid: 182) as compare to anarchistic nature of [url=http://itpubs.net/home.php?mod=space&uid=87348][/url] international politics. In [url=http://www.teatrodeoro.com/hollisterde.php]hollister deutschland[/url] this case, the central government monopolized all means of violence and it is 'unchallengeable power' by all competent [url=http://www.thehygienerevolution.com/hollister.php]hollister france[/url] parties. Thus, domestic peace can be achieved with limited possibilities of violence through strengthen internal legal framework and pluralistic interests (ibid: 506-511). However, due to lack of hierarchic structure, balance of power in domestic sphere and its stumbling blocks are threatened by extreme power politics between Hamas and Fatah.

III.Empirical Findings
National, Hamas's and Fatah's Interests
In Palestinian context, the national interest is defined in the form of power struggle between Palestinian factions in domestic sphere and with the state of Israeli in international sphere. According to recent survey result, "the lack of national unity due to the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip" is one of the top three problems that the Palestinian society confronts today (PSR 2012: pull no. 43). The Doha Debate's survey result (April 2008) shows also that Hamas-Fatah conflict (38%) and Israel (34%) are believed to be the two biggest threats to Palestinians today. Thus, lack of national unity enormously undermines to have defined means to serve the national interests at best.
Since form its establishment in the early 1960s, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Fatah as dominant faction, have dominated the Palestinian political struggle. Its main interest has been the establishment of state of Palestinian in a secular nationalist framework. Following the 1993 Oslo accords, Fatah has recognized the state of Israeli, the two state solutions and changes its political strategy into peaceful resistance. Contrary, Hamas has been interested to establish an Islam Palestinian state. According to its political leader, Khalid Mishal, Hamas does not recognize the state of Israeli and openly seeks Israeli's destruction (Rabbani 2008). As a result, it has been used armed resistance as its main political strategy.
From its establishment in the late 1980s Hamas is not a member of PLO because of sharp competition between Hamas and Fatah to dominate the struggle for independence (Brown 2010). Consequently, this power struggle among Palestinian political factions has been forced the political elites to see only their factional interests and pay less attention for the national interests (Issa 2010). Historically, Hamas and Fatah have a "history of rivalry" (Pettengill and Ahmed 2011:7). More specifically, according to the Doha Debate's survey result (April 2008), 64 percent of the correspondent believed that "political rivalry for control of power and wealth" is the main cause for Hamas-Fatah conflict.
Hence, this political struggle between Hamas and Fatah is characterized whereby Fatah tries to defend its status quo and Hamas tries to get legitimacy and hegemony. In this regard, Fatah defends its status quo [url=http://www.mxitcms.com/abercrombie/]abercrombie milano[/url] in the form of monopolizing Palestinian Authority's (PA) security apparatus, armed force, dominating the national institutions building process and presenting itself as a main channel for international aid and support. Contrary, Hamas organized itself into three wings: political, military and social welfare . From its organizational wings, it is clear that Hamas tries to get support and legitimacy from Palestinians and anti-Israeli [url=http://jiujinshan.chuanke.com/home.php?mod=space&uid=204763][/url] countries (Ghanem 2008: 473). By politicization of the Oslo Peace Accords, Hamas presents itself as a freedom fighter from Israeli's occupation and Fatah's surrender. Accordingly, Hamas and Fatah developed their own political strategies, which are designed to serve the factional interest ahead of and sometimes at the expense of the national interests. This trend prevails the static nature of Palestinian domestic politics or what Morgenthau describes as 'the effect', which defines the political struggle. Thus, the Palestinian national interest is in state of deadlock largely, if not to-tally, from domestic rivalry power politics.
Current Distribution of Power
Hamas and Fatah have been leading two separate Palestinian mini-governments. Hamas is trying to build one party State administration in Gaza Strips, which is lead by Prime Minister Ismail Haniya. Whereas, Fatah is trying to establish a technocratic government in West Bank, which is lead by Prime Minister Salam Fayad. The reconciliation processes, which are aimed to bring these two mini governments into one and establish the national unity government, are not so far fruitful because of the power struggle. The current distribution of power is distributed unevenly in terms of security, political hegemony and administration.
The security accepts of the struggle between Hamas and Fatah has two versions. The first is related to control over the security apparatus of the PA (Rabbani 2008: 76). The second is to provide adequate security for the Palestinians against yoke of Israeli's occupation (Pettengill and Ahmed 2011:9). Following the 2006 election, both factions established their own government and security apparatus in order to monopolize power. This competition for security has been enormously affecting the establishment of the unity government. These two head-to-head governments are established through military contestations and without having "electoral legitimization" (APOME 2011: 1). As a result, the issue of factional security and survival become the central element of the reconciliation process.
The political struggle between Hamas and Fatah is based on political strategy to destroy each other and to be the main political address of the Palestinian people (Rabbani 2008: 77). Fatah has gained international support since from the 1993 Oslo agreement; how-ever, Hamas is still labeled as a terrorist organization by the West. Following the war-on-terror movement, most pro-Hamas countries have changed "their position towards the perception of the West" (Kumaraswamy 2005: 49). Thus, Hamas is interested to involve in the PA to defend its hegemony and status. Fatah has also lost its political hegemony because of its incapability to pressurize the international community to materialize the promises they made. With these two different political statuses, both factions are competing each other to build their prestige and defend their status and interest.
During the Arafat's regime, Fatah has criticized in terms of corruption and neopatrimonialism practice (Ghanem 2008: 472). However, after the split between West Bank and Gaza Strip, Fatah has tried to improve the livelihood by establishing a technocratic government. However, Hamas has a well established networks to provide social services, and a better stand to fight corruption (Rabbani 2008). In terms of financial issue, Fatah has received international support and used Israeli's institutions to collect tax. It is believed that Hamas receives now financial support from Iran and most other pro-Hamas countries "either frozen, close down, or closely monitored the accounts of a number of Hamas leaders and affiliated associations" (Kumaraswamy 2005: 49). Thus, the current distribution of power, in terms of security, political hegemony, administrative and finical, is distributed unequally. Thus, reconciliation process [url=http://www.gotprintsigns.com/abercrombiepascher/‎]abercrombie soldes[/url] should focus not only to establish the unity government, but also to bringing these two main factions to equilibrium positions.
Third Parties' Influences on the Reconciliation Process
External actors, particularly Israeli, United State (US) and European Union (EU), have been criticized for using the split between Hamas and Fatah as a central element in their policy (Brom 2011). These external actors put conditions, which are Hamas should first recognize the state of Israeli and accept previous agreements, in order to recognize the newly established unity government. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has condemned Fatah's move towards an agreement with Hamas, and argues that the "Palestinian Authority must choose between a treaty with Hamas or peace with Israel" (BBC 2012). Historically, Israeli supported Islamic movements financially and even "looked Hamas as a potential ally" to fragment Palestinian Nationalism (see Kumaraswamy 2005:50). However, ever since Hamas transferred into powerful and popular force, Israeli has been trying to demolish Hamas.
Both US and EU are interested to see a secular national unity government which accepts the state of Israeli. For this sake, the US, Israeli, and EU have indicated that if the unity government does not recognize the state of Israeli and abide by existing accords, they are ready to cut their financial [url=http://www.tagverts.com/barbour.php]barbour deutschland[/url] support and to put diplomatic and economic sanctions (Rabbani 2008). On the other hand, Arab nations will support the reconciliation, as far as they believe that the national unity government will meet their interests at best (Brom 2012). Thus, the reconciliation process between Hamas and Fatah is not only the Palestinian domestic affair, but also regional and international affair.
Future Distribution of Power
The issues of sharing political and administrative power of the national unity government are the central element of the reconciliation agreements. According to Mecca agreement, Hamas and Fatah agreed on the selection criteria of Prime Minister and Minister of Interior. However, Hamas and Fatah have failed to abide by and implement the Mecca agreement. Cairo and Doha agreements have also faced the same problem. However, Hamas and Fatah were agreed that the current [url=http://www.sidegemeinde.com/peutereyoutlet.php]peuterey sito ufficiale[/url] PA president, Mahmoud Abbas, would lead the national unity government as "interim prime minister" (Toameh 2012). However, they could not so far agree on who will be the Minister of Interior. Moreover, these agreements spelled out some general principles and left detail issues like security issues, how Hamas's and Fatah's security apparatus will integrate and etc. All these detail issues are critical and will [url=http://www.davidhabchy.com]barbour outlet[/url] hinder the success of the reconciliation process.
Moreover, distribution of power depends also on legitimization of PA. Hamas considers the PA as "illegitimate or semilegitimate entity" (Cohen 2012: 465). Hamas considers Abbas as legitimate president and Fayyad's government as "illegitimate government" (Brown 2010: 40). Fatah also considers Hamas as an Islamic movement, which is a treat for the establishment of Palestinian state in the secular framework. Fatah and Hamas do not consider each other as a legitimate player and deploy a zero-sum political tactic in order to marginalize each other. This is also a challenge for legitimization of PA and reconciliation process.

The success of the [url=http://www.agentparadise.com]woolrich outlet[/url] reconciliation process in sharing power within Palestinian political factions is also depend on the general form of political struggle that each faction selects to operate. Hamas argues that the general form of political struggle to get rid of Israeli's occupation and to establish the state of Palestinian should be resistance, in its all forms. According to Fatah, the strategy of armed resistance could not bring any peace rather it complicates the struggle and increase the burden and misery. Thus, this difference on the general form of struggle prohibits the establishment of balance of power among Palestinian factions and national unity government.
IV.Conclusion
As Morgenthau notes international and domestic politics, in the Palestinian context, the national interest is defined in the form of power struggle between Palestinian factions in domestic sphere. A historical reading prevails that Hamas and Fatah have a 'history of rivalry', which is expressed by acute power struggle based on factional interests. To achieve their interests, political struggle between Hamas and Fatah encompasses all forms of struggle. As a result, Palestinian domestic politics is under the deadlock state of affairs. This static feature of Palestinian politics is emanated from self-help approaches of Hamas and Fatah, which are what Morgenthau describes as 'the effect'. Moreover, due to the absence of a hierarchic structure, Palestinian domestic politics is dominated by violence mechanisms and low level of domestic peace resulted from asymmetric distribution of power between Fatah and Hamas.

The establishment of national unity government is an instrument to create and maintain a system of balance of power among Palestinian political factions, more specifically between Hamas and Fatah, whose interest and policies shape the destiny of the Palestinian society. To take out the Palestinian domestic politics from its deadlock nature, reconciliation process should focus on the security issues, future distribution of power and details mechanisms of implementations. The external actors are playing significant role, however, it is crucial to see Hamas-Fatah conflict at its own broader nature and relate Palestinian domestic political schism not only to third parties' influence, but also to broader world structure, such as the logic of power politics and balance of power within a state-under-the-making.
References
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Swim Together or Sink Together: Is Reconciliation Possible Between Hamas and Fatah?Article Summary: There have been many initiatives undertaken to reconcile Hamas-Fatah conflict and to establish Palestinian unity government. Though these initiatives ended up with signing three agreements, the reconciliation processes seem to be doomed to failure. The main cause of the conflict is lack of equilibrium of power. Morgenthau's classical realism theory is used to conceptualize the interstate political struggle within Palestinian society. Quantitative historical analysis is employed to explore the stumbling blocks of reconciliation process between Hamas and Fatah within their historical context.
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